Merge pull request #10981 from qzhuyan/docs/william/tls-partial-chain-add-defaults
chore: add missing TLS defaults in emqx.conf
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@ -1673,6 +1673,41 @@ crl_cache_refresh_interval = 15m
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## Value: Ciphers
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listener.ssl.external.ciphers = TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256,TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256,ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384,ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384,ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384,ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384,ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA,ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384,ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384,ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384,ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384,DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384,DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256,AES256-GCM-SHA384,AES256-SHA256,ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256,ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256,ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256,ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256,ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256,ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256,ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256,ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256,DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256,DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256,AES128-GCM-SHA256,AES128-SHA256,ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA,ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA,DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA,ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA,ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA,AES256-SHA,ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA,ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA,DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA,ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA,ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA,AES128-SHA
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## When EMQX verifies a client certificate during the x509 path validation
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## process, it constructs a certificate chain that starts with the client
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## certificate and ends with a trust anchor.
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## By default, if the setting is set to `false`, the trust anchor is the
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## rootCA, and the certificate chain must be complete.
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## However, if the setting is set to `true` or `cacert_from_cacertfile`,
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## the last certificate in the cacertfile will be used as the trust anchor
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## certificate (such as an intermediate CA). This creates a partial chain
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## in the path validation.
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## Alternatively, if the setting is set to `two_cacerts_from_cacertfile`,
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## one of the last two certificates in the cacertfile will be used as the
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## trust anchor certificate, forming a partial chain. This option is
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## particularly useful for CA certificate rotation.
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## However, please note that it incurs some additional overhead, so it
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## should only be used for certificate rotation purposes.
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##
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## Values: false | true | cacert_from_cacertfile | two_cacerts_from_cacertfile
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## listener.ssl.external.partial_chain = false
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## For additional client certificate validation, the value defined here must present in the
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## 'Extended Key Usage' of client certificate defined in
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## [rfc5280](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.12).
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##
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## Allowed values are
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## - "clientAuth"
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## - "serverAuth"
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## - "codeSigning"
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## - "emailProtection"
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## - "timeStamping"
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## - "ocspSigning"
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## - raw OID, example: "OID:1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2"
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## Comma-separated string is also supported for validating the subset of key usages.
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## example, "serverAuth,OID:1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2"
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##
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## listener.ssl.external.verify_peer_ext_key_usage = "clientAuth"
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## Ciphers for TLS PSK.
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## Note that 'listener.ssl.external.ciphers' and 'listener.ssl.external.psk_ciphers' cannot
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