Merge pull request #12636 from thalesmg/sync-r55-r56-20240304

sync `release-55` to `release-56`
This commit is contained in:
Thales Macedo Garitezi 2024-03-04 14:04:26 -03:00 committed by GitHub
commit 1badbfa81a
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23 changed files with 685 additions and 332 deletions

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@ -269,10 +269,11 @@ do_join(_TopicAcc, [C | Words]) when ?MULTI_LEVEL_WILDCARD_NOT_LAST(C, Words) ->
do_join(TopicAcc, [Word | Words]) ->
do_join(<<TopicAcc/binary, "/", (bin(Word))/binary>>, Words).
-spec parse(topic() | {topic(), map()}) -> {topic() | share(), map()}.
parse(TopicFilter) when is_binary(TopicFilter) ->
-spec parse(TF | {TF, map()}) -> {TF, map()} when
TF :: topic() | share().
parse(TopicFilter) when ?IS_TOPIC(TopicFilter) ->
parse(TopicFilter, #{});
parse({TopicFilter, Options}) when is_binary(TopicFilter) ->
parse({TopicFilter, Options}) when ?IS_TOPIC(TopicFilter) ->
parse(TopicFilter, Options).
-spec parse(topic() | share(), map()) -> {topic() | share(), map()}.
@ -282,6 +283,10 @@ parse(#share{topic = Topic = <<?QUEUE, "/", _/binary>>}, _Options) ->
error({invalid_topic_filter, Topic});
parse(#share{topic = Topic = <<?SHARE, "/", _/binary>>}, _Options) ->
error({invalid_topic_filter, Topic});
parse(#share{} = T, #{nl := 1} = _Options) ->
%% Protocol Error and Should Disconnect
%% MQTT-5.0 [MQTT-3.8.3-4] and [MQTT-4.13.1-1]
error({invalid_subopts_nl, maybe_format_share(T)});
parse(<<?QUEUE, "/", Topic/binary>>, Options) ->
parse(#share{group = <<?QUEUE>>, topic = Topic}, Options);
parse(TopicFilter = <<?SHARE, "/", Rest/binary>>, Options) ->

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@ -859,34 +859,19 @@ maybe_retry({error, Reason}, Context, ReplyFunAndArgs) ->
maybe_retry(Result, _Context, ReplyFunAndArgs) ->
emqx_resource:apply_reply_fun(ReplyFunAndArgs, Result).
%% The HOCON schema system may generate sensitive keys with this format
is_sensitive_key(Atom) when is_atom(Atom) ->
is_sensitive_key(erlang:atom_to_binary(Atom));
is_sensitive_key(Bin) when is_binary(Bin), (size(Bin) =:= 19 orelse size(Bin) =:= 13) ->
%% We want to convert this to lowercase since the http header fields
%% are case insensitive, which means that a user of the Webhook bridge
%% can write this field name in many different ways.
case try_bin_to_lower(Bin) of
<<"authorization">> -> true;
<<"proxy-authorization">> -> true;
_ -> false
end;
is_sensitive_key(_) ->
false.
%% Function that will do a deep traversal of Data and remove sensitive
%% information (i.e., passwords)
redact(Data) ->
emqx_utils:redact(Data, fun is_sensitive_key/1).
emqx_utils:redact(Data).
%% because the body may contain some sensitive data
%% and at the same time the redact function will not scan the binary data
%% and we also can't know the body format and where the sensitive data will be
%% so the easy way to keep data security is redacted the whole body
redact_request({Path, Headers}) ->
{Path, redact(Headers)};
{Path, emqx_utils_redact:redact_headers(Headers)};
redact_request({Path, Headers, _Body}) ->
{Path, redact(Headers), <<"******">>}.
{Path, emqx_utils_redact:redact_headers(Headers), <<"******">>}.
clientid(Msg) -> maps:get(clientid, Msg, undefined).
@ -901,13 +886,6 @@ redact_test_() ->
]
},
[
?_assert(is_sensitive_key(<<"Authorization">>)),
?_assert(is_sensitive_key(<<"AuthoriZation">>)),
?_assert(is_sensitive_key('AuthoriZation')),
?_assert(is_sensitive_key(<<"PrOxy-authoRizaTion">>)),
?_assert(is_sensitive_key('PrOxy-authoRizaTion')),
?_assertNot(is_sensitive_key(<<"Something">>)),
?_assertNot(is_sensitive_key(89)),
?_assertNotEqual(TestData, redact(TestData))
].

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@ -387,6 +387,8 @@ on_get_channel_status(InstanceId, _ChannelId, State) ->
get_payload(#{payload := Payload}) ->
Payload;
get_payload(#{<<"payload">> := Payload}) ->
Payload;
get_payload(Payload) ->
Payload.
parse_payload(ParsedPayload) when is_map(ParsedPayload) ->
@ -714,7 +716,7 @@ render_channel_message(#{is_aligned := IsAligned} = Channel, IoTDBVsn, Message)
DeviceId ->
case get_data_template(Channel, Payloads) of
[] ->
{error, invalid_data};
{error, invalid_template};
DataTemplate ->
case proc_data(DataTemplate, Message) of
{ok, DataList} ->

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@ -503,11 +503,11 @@ t_extract_device_id_from_rule_engine_message(Config) ->
),
ok.
t_sync_invalid_data(Config) ->
t_sync_invalid_template(Config) ->
emqx_bridge_v2_testlib:t_sync_query(
Config,
make_message_fun(iotdb_topic(Config), #{foo => bar, device_id => <<"root.sg27">>}),
is_error_check(invalid_data),
is_error_check(invalid_template),
iotdb_bridge_on_query
).
@ -519,11 +519,11 @@ t_async_device_id_missing(Config) ->
iotdb_bridge_on_query_async
).
t_async_invalid_data(Config) ->
t_async_invalid_template(Config) ->
emqx_bridge_v2_testlib:t_async_query(
Config,
make_message_fun(iotdb_topic(Config), #{foo => bar, device_id => <<"root.sg27">>}),
is_error_check(invalid_data),
is_error_check(invalid_template),
iotdb_bridge_on_query_async
).

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@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ create(Type, Name, Conf0, Opts) ->
msg => "create connector",
type => Type,
name => Name,
config => emqx_utils:redact(Conf0)
config => redact(Conf0, Type)
}),
TypeBin = bin(Type),
ResourceId = resource_id(Type, Name),
@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ update(Type, Name, {OldConf, Conf0}, Opts) ->
msg => "update connector",
type => Type,
name => Name,
config => emqx_utils:redact(Conf)
config => redact(Conf, Type)
}),
case recreate(Type, Name, Conf, Opts) of
{ok, _} ->
@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ update(Type, Name, {OldConf, Conf0}, Opts) ->
msg => "updating_a_non_existing_connector",
type => Type,
name => Name,
config => emqx_utils:redact(Conf)
config => redact(Conf, Type)
}),
create(Type, Name, Conf, Opts);
{error, Reason} ->
@ -379,3 +379,6 @@ override_start_after_created(Config, Opts) ->
set_no_buffer_workers(Opts) ->
Opts#{spawn_buffer_workers => false}.
redact(Conf, _Type) ->
emqx_utils:redact(Conf).

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@ -39,11 +39,12 @@
-export([namespace/0, roots/0, fields/1, desc/1]).
-export([do_get_status/1]).
-export([do_get_status/1, get_status_with_poolname/1]).
-define(LDAP_HOST_OPTIONS, #{
default_port => 389
}).
-define(REDACT_VAL, "******").
-type params_tokens() :: #{atom() => list()}.
-type state() ::
@ -154,18 +155,19 @@ on_start(
false ->
Config2
end,
Options = [
{pool_size, PoolSize},
{auto_reconnect, ?AUTO_RECONNECT_INTERVAL},
{options, Config3}
],
case emqx_resource_pool:start(InstId, ?MODULE, Options) of
case emqx_resource_pool:start(InstId, ?MODULE, [{log_tag, "eldap_info"} | Options]) of
ok ->
emqx_ldap_bind_worker:on_start(
InstId,
Config,
Options,
[{log_tag, "eldap_bind_info"} | Options],
prepare_template(Config, #{pool_name => InstId})
);
{error, Reason} ->
@ -193,7 +195,15 @@ on_query(InstId, {query, Data, Attrs, Timeout}, State) ->
on_query(InstId, {bind, _DN, _Data} = Req, State) ->
emqx_ldap_bind_worker:on_query(InstId, Req, State).
on_get_status(_InstId, #{pool_name := PoolName} = _State) ->
on_get_status(InstId, #{pool_name := PoolName} = State) ->
case get_status_with_poolname(PoolName) of
connected ->
emqx_ldap_bind_worker:on_get_status(InstId, State);
disconnected ->
disconnected
end.
get_status_with_poolname(PoolName) ->
case emqx_resource_pool:health_check_workers(PoolName, fun ?MODULE:do_get_status/1) of
true ->
connected;
@ -209,7 +219,7 @@ do_get_status(Conn) ->
%% if the server is down, the result is {error, ldap_closed}
%% otherwise is {error, invalidDNSyntax/timeout}
{error, ldap_closed} =/=
eldap:search(Conn, [{base, "checkalive"}, {filter, eldap:'approxMatch'("", "")}]).
eldap:search(Conn, [{base, "cn=checkalive"}, {filter, eldap:'approxMatch'("", "")}]).
%% ===================================================================
@ -222,7 +232,8 @@ connect(Options) ->
} =
Conf = proplists:get_value(options, Options),
OpenOpts = maps:to_list(maps:with([port, sslopts], Conf)),
case eldap:open([Host], [{log, fun log/3}, {timeout, RequestTimeout} | OpenOpts]) of
LogTag = proplists:get_value(log_tag, Options),
case eldap:open([Host], [{log, mk_log_func(LogTag)}, {timeout, RequestTimeout} | OpenOpts]) of
{ok, Handle} = Ret ->
%% TODO: teach `eldap` to accept 0-arity closures as passwords.
case eldap:simple_bind(Handle, Username, emqx_secret:unwrap(Password)) of
@ -313,14 +324,21 @@ do_ldap_query(
end.
%% Note: the value of the `_Level` here always is 2
log(_Level, Format, Args) ->
?SLOG(
info,
#{
msg => "eldap_info",
log => io_lib:format(Format, Args)
}
).
mk_log_func(LogTag) ->
fun(_Level, Format, Args) ->
?SLOG(
info,
#{
msg => LogTag,
log => io_lib:format(Format, [redact_ldap_log(Arg) || Arg <- Args])
}
)
end.
redact_ldap_log({'BindRequest', Version, Name, {simple, _}}) ->
{'BindRequest', Version, Name, {simple, ?REDACT_VAL}};
redact_ldap_log(Arg) ->
Arg.
prepare_template(Config, State) ->
maps:fold(fun prepare_template/3, State, Config).

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@ -24,7 +24,8 @@
-export([
on_start/4,
on_stop/2,
on_query/3
on_query/3,
on_get_status/2
]).
%% ecpool connect & reconnect
@ -103,6 +104,11 @@ on_query(
{error, {unrecoverable_error, Reason}}
end.
on_get_status(_InstId, #{bind_pool_name := PoolName}) ->
emqx_ldap:get_status_with_poolname(PoolName);
on_get_status(_InstId, _) ->
connected.
%% ===================================================================
connect(Conf) ->

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@ -774,6 +774,12 @@ subscribe(#{clientid := ClientID, topic := Topic} = Sub) ->
case do_subscribe(ClientID, Topic, Opts) of
{error, channel_not_found} ->
{404, ?CLIENTID_NOT_FOUND};
{error, invalid_subopts_nl} ->
{400, #{
code => <<"INVALID_PARAMETER">>,
message =>
<<"Invalid Subscribe options: `no_local` not allowed for shared-sub. See [MQTT-3.8.3-4]">>
}};
{error, Reason} ->
Message = list_to_binary(io_lib:format("~p", [Reason])),
{500, #{code => <<"UNKNOWN_ERROR">>, message => Message}};
@ -797,10 +803,13 @@ subscribe_batch(#{clientid := ClientID, topics := Topics}) ->
end.
unsubscribe(#{clientid := ClientID, topic := Topic}) ->
{NTopic, _} = emqx_topic:parse(Topic),
case do_unsubscribe(ClientID, Topic) of
{error, channel_not_found} ->
{404, ?CLIENTID_NOT_FOUND};
{unsubscribe, [{Topic, #{}}]} ->
{unsubscribe, [{UnSubedT, #{}}]} when
(UnSubedT =:= NTopic) orelse (UnSubedT =:= Topic)
->
{204}
end.
@ -817,18 +826,25 @@ unsubscribe_batch(#{clientid := ClientID, topics := Topics}) ->
%% internal function
do_subscribe(ClientID, Topic0, Options) ->
{Topic, Opts} = emqx_topic:parse(Topic0, Options),
TopicTable = [{Topic, Opts}],
case emqx_mgmt:subscribe(ClientID, TopicTable) of
{error, Reason} ->
{error, Reason};
{subscribe, Subscriptions, Node} ->
case proplists:is_defined(Topic, Subscriptions) of
true ->
{ok, Options#{node => Node, clientid => ClientID, topic => Topic}};
false ->
{error, unknow_error}
try emqx_topic:parse(Topic0, Options) of
{Topic, Opts} ->
TopicTable = [{Topic, Opts}],
case emqx_mgmt:subscribe(ClientID, TopicTable) of
{error, Reason} ->
{error, Reason};
{subscribe, Subscriptions, Node} ->
case proplists:is_defined(Topic, Subscriptions) of
true ->
{ok, Options#{node => Node, clientid => ClientID, topic => Topic0}};
false ->
{error, unknow_error}
end
end
catch
error:{invalid_subopts_nl, _} ->
{error, invalid_subopts_nl};
_:Reason ->
{error, Reason}
end.
-spec do_unsubscribe(emqx_types:clientid(), emqx_types:topic()) ->

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@ -17,9 +17,12 @@
-compile(export_all).
-compile(nowarn_export_all).
-include_lib("emqx/include/emqx_mqtt.hrl").
-include_lib("emqx/include/emqx_router.hrl").
-include_lib("eunit/include/eunit.hrl").
-include_lib("common_test/include/ct.hrl").
-include_lib("snabbkaffe/include/snabbkaffe.hrl").
-include_lib("emqx/include/asserts.hrl").
all() ->
AllTCs = emqx_common_test_helpers:all(?MODULE),
@ -758,6 +761,132 @@ t_client_id_not_found(_Config) ->
{error, {Http, _, Body}}, PostFun(post, PathFun(["unsubscribe", "bulk"]), [UnsubBody])
).
t_subscribe_shared_topic(_Config) ->
ClientId = <<"client_subscribe_shared">>,
{ok, C} = emqtt:start_link(#{clientid => ClientId}),
{ok, _} = emqtt:connect(C),
ClientPuber = <<"publish_client">>,
{ok, PC} = emqtt:start_link(#{clientid => ClientPuber}),
{ok, _} = emqtt:connect(PC),
AuthHeader = emqx_mgmt_api_test_util:auth_header_(),
Http200 = {"HTTP/1.1", 200, "OK"},
Http204 = {"HTTP/1.1", 204, "No Content"},
PathFun = fun(Suffix) ->
emqx_mgmt_api_test_util:api_path(["clients", "client_subscribe_shared"] ++ Suffix)
end,
PostFun = fun(Method, Path, Data) ->
emqx_mgmt_api_test_util:request_api(
Method, Path, "", AuthHeader, Data, #{return_all => true}
)
end,
SharedT = <<"$share/group/testtopic">>,
NonSharedT = <<"t/#">>,
SubBodyFun = fun(T) -> #{topic => T, qos => 1, nl => 0, rh => 1} end,
UnSubBodyFun = fun(T) -> #{topic => T} end,
%% ====================
%% Client Subscribe
?assertMatch(
{ok, {Http200, _, _}},
PostFun(post, PathFun(["subscribe"]), SubBodyFun(SharedT))
),
?assertMatch(
{ok, {Http200, _, _}},
PostFun(
post,
PathFun(["subscribe", "bulk"]),
[SubBodyFun(T) || T <- [SharedT, NonSharedT]]
)
),
%% assert subscription
?assertMatch(
[
{_, #share{group = <<"group">>, topic = <<"testtopic">>}},
{_, <<"t/#">>}
],
ets:tab2list(?SUBSCRIPTION)
),
?assertMatch(
[
{{#share{group = <<"group">>, topic = <<"testtopic">>}, _}, #{
nl := 0, qos := 1, rh := 1, rap := 0
}},
{{<<"t/#">>, _}, #{nl := 0, qos := 1, rh := 1, rap := 0}}
],
ets:tab2list(?SUBOPTION)
),
?assertMatch(
[{emqx_shared_subscription, <<"group">>, <<"testtopic">>, _}],
ets:tab2list(emqx_shared_subscription)
),
%% assert subscription virtual
_ = emqtt:publish(PC, <<"testtopic">>, <<"msg1">>, [{qos, 0}]),
?assertReceive({publish, #{topic := <<"testtopic">>, payload := <<"msg1">>}}),
_ = emqtt:publish(PC, <<"t/1">>, <<"msg2">>, [{qos, 0}]),
?assertReceive({publish, #{topic := <<"t/1">>, payload := <<"msg2">>}}),
%% ====================
%% Client Unsubscribe
?assertMatch(
{ok, {Http204, _, _}},
PostFun(post, PathFun(["unsubscribe"]), UnSubBodyFun(SharedT))
),
?assertMatch(
{ok, {Http204, _, _}},
PostFun(
post,
PathFun(["unsubscribe", "bulk"]),
[UnSubBodyFun(T) || T <- [SharedT, NonSharedT]]
)
),
%% assert subscription
?assertEqual([], ets:tab2list(?SUBSCRIPTION)),
?assertEqual([], ets:tab2list(?SUBOPTION)),
?assertEqual([], ets:tab2list(emqx_shared_subscription)),
%% assert subscription virtual
_ = emqtt:publish(PC, <<"testtopic">>, <<"msg3">>, [{qos, 0}]),
_ = emqtt:publish(PC, <<"t/1">>, <<"msg4">>, [{qos, 0}]),
?assertNotReceive({publish, #{topic := <<"testtopic">>, payload := <<"msg3">>}}),
?assertNotReceive({publish, #{topic := <<"t/1">>, payload := <<"msg4">>}}).
t_subscribe_shared_topic_nl(_Config) ->
AuthHeader = emqx_mgmt_api_test_util:auth_header_(),
Http400 = {"HTTP/1.1", 400, "Bad Request"},
Body =
"{\"code\":\"INVALID_PARAMETER\","
"\"message\":\"Invalid Subscribe options: `no_local` not allowed for shared-sub. See [MQTT-3.8.3-4]\"}",
ClientId = <<"client_subscribe_shared">>,
{ok, C} = emqtt:start_link(#{clientid => ClientId}),
{ok, _} = emqtt:connect(C),
PathFun = fun(Suffix) ->
emqx_mgmt_api_test_util:api_path(["clients", "client_subscribe_shared"] ++ Suffix)
end,
PostFun = fun(Method, Path, Data) ->
emqx_mgmt_api_test_util:request_api(
Method, Path, "", AuthHeader, Data, #{return_all => true}
)
end,
T = <<"$share/group/testtopic">>,
?assertMatch(
{error, {Http400, _, Body}},
PostFun(post, PathFun(["subscribe"]), #{topic => T, qos => 1, nl => 1, rh => 1})
).
time_string_to_epoch_millisecond(DateTime) ->
time_string_to_epoch(DateTime, millisecond).

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@ -834,8 +834,7 @@ cert_data(undefined) ->
cert_data(AllListeners) ->
Points = lists:foldl(
fun(ListenerType, PointsAcc) ->
PointsAcc ++
points_of_listeners(ListenerType, AllListeners)
lists:append(PointsAcc, points_of_listeners(ListenerType, AllListeners))
end,
_PointsInitAcc = [],
?LISTENER_TYPES
@ -847,53 +846,71 @@ cert_data(AllListeners) ->
points_of_listeners(Type, AllListeners) ->
do_points_of_listeners(Type, maps:get(Type, AllListeners, undefined)).
-define(CERT_TYPES, [certfile]).
-spec do_points_of_listeners(Type, TypeOfListeners) ->
-spec do_points_of_listeners(Type, Listeners) ->
[_Point :: {[{LabelKey, LabelValue}], Epoch}]
when
Type :: ssl | wss | quic,
TypeOfListeners :: #{ListenerName :: atom() => ListenerConf :: map()} | undefined,
Listeners :: #{ListenerName :: atom() => ListenerConf :: map()} | undefined,
LabelKey :: atom(),
LabelValue :: atom(),
Epoch :: non_neg_integer().
do_points_of_listeners(_, undefined) ->
[];
do_points_of_listeners(ListenerType, TypeOfListeners) ->
do_points_of_listeners(Type, Listeners) ->
lists:foldl(
fun(Name, PointsAcc) ->
lists:foldl(
fun(CertType, AccIn) ->
case
emqx_utils_maps:deep_get(
[Name, ssl_options, CertType], TypeOfListeners, undefined
)
of
undefined -> AccIn;
Path -> [gen_point(ListenerType, Name, Path) | AccIn]
end
end,
[],
?CERT_TYPES
) ++ PointsAcc
case
emqx_utils_maps:deep_get([Name, enable], Listeners, false) andalso
emqx_utils_maps:deep_get(
[Name, ssl_options, certfile], Listeners, undefined
)
of
false -> PointsAcc;
undefined -> PointsAcc;
Path -> [gen_point_cert_expiry_at(Type, Name, Path) | PointsAcc]
end
end,
[],
maps:keys(TypeOfListeners)
%% listener names
maps:keys(Listeners)
).
gen_point(Type, Name, Path) ->
gen_point_cert_expiry_at(Type, Name, Path) ->
{[{listener_type, Type}, {listener_name, Name}], cert_expiry_at_from_path(Path)}.
%% TODO: cert manager for more generic utils functions
cert_expiry_at_from_path(Path0) ->
Path = emqx_schema:naive_env_interpolation(Path0),
{ok, PemBin} = file:read_file(Path),
[CertEntry | _] = public_key:pem_decode(PemBin),
Cert = public_key:pem_entry_decode(CertEntry),
%% TODO: Not fully tested for all certs type
{'utcTime', NotAfterUtc} =
Cert#'Certificate'.'tbsCertificate'#'TBSCertificate'.validity#'Validity'.'notAfter',
utc_time_to_epoch(NotAfterUtc).
try
case file:read_file(Path) of
{ok, PemBin} ->
[CertEntry | _] = public_key:pem_decode(PemBin),
Cert = public_key:pem_entry_decode(CertEntry),
%% TODO: Not fully tested for all certs type
{'utcTime', NotAfterUtc} =
Cert#'Certificate'.'tbsCertificate'#'TBSCertificate'.validity#'Validity'.'notAfter',
utc_time_to_epoch(NotAfterUtc);
{error, Reason} ->
?SLOG(error, #{
msg => "read_cert_file_failed",
path => Path0,
resolved_path => Path,
reason => Reason
}),
0
end
catch
E:R:S ->
?SLOG(error, #{
msg => "obtain_cert_expiry_time_failed",
error => E,
reason => R,
stacktrace => S,
path => Path0,
resolved_path => Path
}),
0
end.
utc_time_to_epoch(UtcTime) ->
date_to_expiry_epoch(utc_time_to_datetime(UtcTime)).
@ -902,7 +919,7 @@ utc_time_to_datetime(Str) ->
{ok, [Year, Month, Day, Hour, Minute, Second], _} = io_lib:fread(
"~2d~2d~2d~2d~2d~2dZ", Str
),
%% Alwoys Assuming YY is in 2000
%% Always Assuming YY is in 2000
{{2000 + Year, Month, Day}, {Hour, Minute, Second}}.
%% 62167219200 =:= calendar:datetime_to_gregorian_seconds({{1970, 1, 1}, {0, 0, 0}}).

View File

@ -1145,6 +1145,7 @@ t_parse_date_errors(_) ->
),
%% Compatibility test
%% UTC+0
UnixTs = 1653561612,
?assertEqual(
UnixTs,
@ -1159,6 +1160,27 @@ t_parse_date_errors(_) ->
?assertEqual(
UnixTs,
emqx_rule_funcs:date_to_unix_ts(second, <<"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S">>, <<"2022-05-26 10-40-12">>)
),
%% UTC+0
UnixTsLeap0 = 1582986700,
?assertEqual(
UnixTsLeap0,
emqx_rule_funcs:date_to_unix_ts(second, <<"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S">>, <<"2020-02-29 14:31:40">>)
),
%% UTC+0
UnixTsLeap1 = 1709297071,
?assertEqual(
UnixTsLeap1,
emqx_rule_funcs:date_to_unix_ts(second, <<"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S">>, <<"2024-03-01 12:44:31">>)
),
%% UTC+0
UnixTsLeap2 = 1709535387,
?assertEqual(
UnixTsLeap2,
emqx_rule_funcs:date_to_unix_ts(second, <<"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S">>, <<"2024-03-04 06:56:27">>)
).
%%------------------------------------------------------------------------------

View File

@ -659,146 +659,20 @@ try_to_existing_atom(Convert, Data, Encoding) ->
_:Reason -> {error, Reason}
end.
%% NOTE: keep alphabetical order
is_sensitive_key(aws_secret_access_key) -> true;
is_sensitive_key("aws_secret_access_key") -> true;
is_sensitive_key(<<"aws_secret_access_key">>) -> true;
is_sensitive_key(password) -> true;
is_sensitive_key("password") -> true;
is_sensitive_key(<<"password">>) -> true;
is_sensitive_key('proxy-authorization') -> true;
is_sensitive_key("proxy-authorization") -> true;
is_sensitive_key(<<"proxy-authorization">>) -> true;
is_sensitive_key(secret) -> true;
is_sensitive_key("secret") -> true;
is_sensitive_key(<<"secret">>) -> true;
is_sensitive_key(secret_access_key) -> true;
is_sensitive_key("secret_access_key") -> true;
is_sensitive_key(<<"secret_access_key">>) -> true;
is_sensitive_key(secret_key) -> true;
is_sensitive_key("secret_key") -> true;
is_sensitive_key(<<"secret_key">>) -> true;
is_sensitive_key(security_token) -> true;
is_sensitive_key("security_token") -> true;
is_sensitive_key(<<"security_token">>) -> true;
is_sensitive_key(sp_private_key) -> true;
is_sensitive_key(<<"sp_private_key">>) -> true;
is_sensitive_key(token) -> true;
is_sensitive_key("token") -> true;
is_sensitive_key(<<"token">>) -> true;
is_sensitive_key(jwt) -> true;
is_sensitive_key("jwt") -> true;
is_sensitive_key(<<"jwt">>) -> true;
is_sensitive_key(authorization) -> true;
is_sensitive_key("authorization") -> true;
is_sensitive_key(<<"authorization">>) -> true;
is_sensitive_key(bind_password) -> true;
is_sensitive_key("bind_password") -> true;
is_sensitive_key(<<"bind_password">>) -> true;
is_sensitive_key(Key) -> is_authorization(Key).
redact(Term) ->
do_redact(Term, fun is_sensitive_key/1).
emqx_utils_redact:redact(Term).
redact(Term, Checker) ->
do_redact(Term, fun(V) ->
is_sensitive_key(V) orelse Checker(V)
end).
do_redact([E | Rest], Checker) ->
[do_redact(E, Checker) | do_redact(Rest, Checker)];
do_redact(M, Checker) when is_map(M) ->
maps:map(
fun(K, V) ->
do_redact(K, V, Checker)
end,
M
);
do_redact({Key, Value}, Checker) ->
case Checker(Key) of
true ->
{Key, redact_v(Value)};
false ->
{do_redact(Key, Checker), do_redact(Value, Checker)}
end;
do_redact(T, Checker) when is_tuple(T) ->
Elements = erlang:tuple_to_list(T),
Redact = do_redact(Elements, Checker),
erlang:list_to_tuple(Redact);
do_redact(Any, _Checker) ->
Any.
do_redact(K, V, Checker) ->
case Checker(K) of
true ->
redact_v(V);
false ->
do_redact(V, Checker)
end.
-define(REDACT_VAL, "******").
redact_v(V) when is_binary(V) -> <<?REDACT_VAL>>;
%% The HOCON schema system may generate sensitive values with this format
redact_v([{str, Bin}]) when is_binary(Bin) ->
[{str, <<?REDACT_VAL>>}];
redact_v(_V) ->
?REDACT_VAL.
emqx_utils_redact:redact(Term, Checker).
deobfuscate(NewConf, OldConf) ->
maps:fold(
fun(K, V, Acc) ->
case maps:find(K, OldConf) of
error ->
case is_redacted(K, V) of
%% don't put redacted value into new config
true -> Acc;
false -> Acc#{K => V}
end;
{ok, OldV} when is_map(V), is_map(OldV) ->
Acc#{K => deobfuscate(V, OldV)};
{ok, OldV} ->
case is_redacted(K, V) of
true ->
Acc#{K => OldV};
_ ->
Acc#{K => V}
end
end
end,
#{},
NewConf
).
emqx_utils_redact:deobfuscate(NewConf, OldConf).
is_redacted(K, V) ->
do_is_redacted(K, V, fun is_sensitive_key/1).
emqx_utils_redact:is_redacted(K, V).
is_redacted(K, V, Fun) ->
do_is_redacted(K, V, fun(E) ->
is_sensitive_key(E) orelse Fun(E)
end).
do_is_redacted(K, ?REDACT_VAL, Fun) ->
Fun(K);
do_is_redacted(K, <<?REDACT_VAL>>, Fun) ->
Fun(K);
do_is_redacted(K, WrappedFun, Fun) when is_function(WrappedFun, 0) ->
%% wrapped by `emqx_secret' or other module
do_is_redacted(K, WrappedFun(), Fun);
do_is_redacted(_K, _V, _Fun) ->
false.
%% This is ugly, however, the authorization is case-insensitive,
%% the best way is to check chars one by one and quickly exit when any position is not equal,
%% but in Erlang, this may not perform well, so here only check the first one
is_authorization([Cap | _] = Key) when Cap == $a; Cap == $A ->
is_authorization2(Key);
is_authorization(<<Cap, _/binary>> = Key) when Cap == $a; Cap == $A ->
is_authorization2(erlang:binary_to_list(Key));
is_authorization(_Any) ->
false.
is_authorization2(Str) ->
"authorization" == string:to_lower(Str).
emqx_utils_redact:is_redacted(K, V, Fun).
-ifdef(TEST).
-include_lib("eunit/include/eunit.hrl").
@ -812,112 +686,6 @@ ipv6_probe_test() ->
ok
end.
redact_test_() ->
Case = fun(TypeF, KeyIn) ->
Key = TypeF(KeyIn),
?assert(is_sensitive_key(Key)),
%% direct
?assertEqual({Key, ?REDACT_VAL}, redact({Key, foo})),
?assertEqual(#{Key => ?REDACT_VAL}, redact(#{Key => foo})),
?assertEqual({Key, Key, Key}, redact({Key, Key, Key})),
?assertEqual({[{Key, ?REDACT_VAL}], bar}, redact({[{Key, foo}], bar})),
%% 1 level nested
?assertEqual([{Key, ?REDACT_VAL}], redact([{Key, foo}])),
?assertEqual([#{Key => ?REDACT_VAL}], redact([#{Key => foo}])),
%% 2 level nested
?assertEqual(#{opts => [{Key, ?REDACT_VAL}]}, redact(#{opts => [{Key, foo}]})),
?assertEqual(#{opts => #{Key => ?REDACT_VAL}}, redact(#{opts => #{Key => foo}})),
?assertEqual({opts, [{Key, ?REDACT_VAL}]}, redact({opts, [{Key, foo}]})),
%% 3 level nested
?assertEqual([#{opts => [{Key, ?REDACT_VAL}]}], redact([#{opts => [{Key, foo}]}])),
?assertEqual([{opts, [{Key, ?REDACT_VAL}]}], redact([{opts, [{Key, foo}]}])),
?assertEqual([{opts, [#{Key => ?REDACT_VAL}]}], redact([{opts, [#{Key => foo}]}])),
%% improper lists
?assertEqual([{opts, [{Key, ?REDACT_VAL} | oops]}], redact([{opts, [{Key, foo} | oops]}]))
end,
Types = [
{atom, fun identity/1},
{string, fun emqx_utils_conv:str/1},
{binary, fun emqx_utils_conv:bin/1}
],
Keys = [
authorization,
aws_secret_access_key,
password,
'proxy-authorization',
secret,
secret_key,
secret_access_key,
security_token,
token,
bind_password
],
[
{case_name(Type, Key), fun() -> Case(TypeF, Key) end}
|| Key <- Keys,
{Type, TypeF} <- Types
].
redact2_test_() ->
Case = fun(Key, Checker) ->
?assertEqual({Key, ?REDACT_VAL}, redact({Key, foo}, Checker)),
?assertEqual(#{Key => ?REDACT_VAL}, redact(#{Key => foo}, Checker)),
?assertEqual({Key, Key, Key}, redact({Key, Key, Key}, Checker)),
?assertEqual({[{Key, ?REDACT_VAL}], bar}, redact({[{Key, foo}], bar}, Checker))
end,
Checker = fun(E) -> E =:= passcode end,
Keys = [secret, passcode],
[{case_name(atom, Key), fun() -> Case(Key, Checker) end} || Key <- Keys].
deobfuscate_test() ->
NewConf0 = #{foo => <<"bar0">>, password => <<"123456">>},
?assertEqual(NewConf0, deobfuscate(NewConf0, #{foo => <<"bar">>, password => <<"654321">>})),
NewConf1 = #{foo => <<"bar1">>, password => <<?REDACT_VAL>>},
?assertEqual(
#{foo => <<"bar1">>, password => <<"654321">>},
deobfuscate(NewConf1, #{foo => <<"bar">>, password => <<"654321">>})
),
%% Don't have password before and ignore to put redact_val into new config
NewConf2 = #{foo => <<"bar2">>, password => ?REDACT_VAL},
?assertEqual(#{foo => <<"bar2">>}, deobfuscate(NewConf2, #{foo => <<"bar">>})),
%% Don't have password before and should allow put non-redact-val into new config
NewConf3 = #{foo => <<"bar3">>, password => <<"123456">>},
?assertEqual(NewConf3, deobfuscate(NewConf3, #{foo => <<"bar">>})),
ok.
redact_is_authorization_test_() ->
Types = [string, binary],
Keys = ["auThorization", "Authorization", "authorizaTion"],
Case = fun(Type, Key0) ->
Key =
case Type of
binary ->
erlang:list_to_binary(Key0);
_ ->
Key0
end,
?assert(is_sensitive_key(Key))
end,
[{case_name(Type, Key), fun() -> Case(Type, Key) end} || Key <- Keys, Type <- Types].
case_name(Type, Key) ->
lists:concat([Type, "-", Key]).
identity(X) ->
X.
-endif.
pub_props_to_packet(Properties) ->

View File

@ -478,7 +478,8 @@ do_parse(DateStr, Unit, Formatter) ->
(year, V, Res) ->
Res + dy(V) * ?SECONDS_PER_DAY * Precise - (?SECONDS_FROM_0_TO_1970 * Precise);
(month, V, Res) ->
Res + dm(V) * ?SECONDS_PER_DAY * Precise;
Dm = dym(maps:get(year, DateInfo, 0), V),
Res + Dm * ?SECONDS_PER_DAY * Precise;
(day, V, Res) ->
Res + (V * ?SECONDS_PER_DAY * Precise);
(hour, V, Res) ->
@ -563,6 +564,14 @@ date_size(timezone) -> 5;
date_size(timezone1) -> 6;
date_size(timezone2) -> 9.
dym(Y, M) ->
case is_leap_year(Y) of
true when M > 2 ->
dm(M) + 1;
_ ->
dm(M)
end.
dm(1) -> 0;
dm(2) -> 31;
dm(3) -> 59;

View File

@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%% Copyright (c) 2024 EMQ Technologies Co., Ltd. All Rights Reserved.
%%
%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
%%
%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
%%
%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
%% limitations under the License.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-module(emqx_utils_redact).
-export([redact/1, redact/2, redact_headers/1, is_redacted/2, is_redacted/3]).
-export([deobfuscate/2]).
-define(REDACT_VAL, "******").
-define(IS_KEY_HEADERS(K), K == headers; K == <<"headers">>; K == "headers").
%% NOTE: keep alphabetical order
is_sensitive_key(aws_secret_access_key) -> true;
is_sensitive_key("aws_secret_access_key") -> true;
is_sensitive_key(<<"aws_secret_access_key">>) -> true;
is_sensitive_key(password) -> true;
is_sensitive_key("password") -> true;
is_sensitive_key(<<"password">>) -> true;
is_sensitive_key(secret) -> true;
is_sensitive_key("secret") -> true;
is_sensitive_key(<<"secret">>) -> true;
is_sensitive_key(secret_access_key) -> true;
is_sensitive_key("secret_access_key") -> true;
is_sensitive_key(<<"secret_access_key">>) -> true;
is_sensitive_key(secret_key) -> true;
is_sensitive_key("secret_key") -> true;
is_sensitive_key(<<"secret_key">>) -> true;
is_sensitive_key(security_token) -> true;
is_sensitive_key("security_token") -> true;
is_sensitive_key(<<"security_token">>) -> true;
is_sensitive_key(sp_private_key) -> true;
is_sensitive_key(<<"sp_private_key">>) -> true;
is_sensitive_key(token) -> true;
is_sensitive_key("token") -> true;
is_sensitive_key(<<"token">>) -> true;
is_sensitive_key(jwt) -> true;
is_sensitive_key("jwt") -> true;
is_sensitive_key(<<"jwt">>) -> true;
is_sensitive_key(bind_password) -> true;
is_sensitive_key("bind_password") -> true;
is_sensitive_key(<<"bind_password">>) -> true;
is_sensitive_key(_) -> false.
redact(Term) ->
do_redact(Term, fun is_sensitive_key/1).
redact(Term, Checker) ->
do_redact(Term, fun(V) ->
is_sensitive_key(V) orelse Checker(V)
end).
redact_headers(Term) ->
do_redact_headers(Term).
do_redact(L, Checker) when is_list(L) ->
lists:map(fun(E) -> do_redact(E, Checker) end, L);
do_redact(M, Checker) when is_map(M) ->
maps:map(
fun(K, V) ->
do_redact(K, V, Checker)
end,
M
);
do_redact({Headers, Value}, _Checker) when ?IS_KEY_HEADERS(Headers) ->
{Headers, do_redact_headers(Value)};
do_redact({Key, Value}, Checker) ->
case Checker(Key) of
true ->
{Key, redact_v(Value)};
false ->
{do_redact(Key, Checker), do_redact(Value, Checker)}
end;
do_redact(T, Checker) when is_tuple(T) ->
Elements = erlang:tuple_to_list(T),
Redact = do_redact(Elements, Checker),
erlang:list_to_tuple(Redact);
do_redact(Any, _Checker) ->
Any.
do_redact(Headers, V, _Checker) when ?IS_KEY_HEADERS(Headers) ->
do_redact_headers(V);
do_redact(K, V, Checker) ->
case Checker(K) of
true ->
redact_v(V);
false ->
do_redact(V, Checker)
end.
do_redact_headers(List) when is_list(List) ->
lists:map(
fun
({K, V} = Pair) ->
case check_is_sensitive_header(K) of
true ->
{K, redact_v(V)};
_ ->
Pair
end;
(Any) ->
Any
end,
List
);
do_redact_headers(Map) when is_map(Map) ->
maps:map(
fun(K, V) ->
case check_is_sensitive_header(K) of
true ->
redact_v(V);
_ ->
V
end
end,
Map
);
do_redact_headers(Value) ->
Value.
check_is_sensitive_header(Key) ->
Key1 = string:trim(emqx_utils_conv:str(Key)),
is_sensitive_header(string:lowercase(Key1)).
is_sensitive_header("authorization") ->
true;
is_sensitive_header("proxy-authorization") ->
true;
is_sensitive_header(_Any) ->
false.
redact_v(V) when is_binary(V) -> <<?REDACT_VAL>>;
%% The HOCON schema system may generate sensitive values with this format
redact_v([{str, Bin}]) when is_binary(Bin) ->
[{str, <<?REDACT_VAL>>}];
redact_v(_V) ->
?REDACT_VAL.
deobfuscate(NewConf, OldConf) ->
maps:fold(
fun(K, V, Acc) ->
case maps:find(K, OldConf) of
error ->
case is_redacted(K, V) of
%% don't put redacted value into new config
true -> Acc;
false -> Acc#{K => V}
end;
{ok, OldV} when is_map(V), is_map(OldV) ->
Acc#{K => deobfuscate(V, OldV)};
{ok, OldV} ->
case is_redacted(K, V) of
true ->
Acc#{K => OldV};
_ ->
Acc#{K => V}
end
end
end,
#{},
NewConf
).
is_redacted(K, V) ->
do_is_redacted(K, V, fun is_sensitive_key/1).
is_redacted(K, V, Fun) ->
do_is_redacted(K, V, fun(E) ->
is_sensitive_key(E) orelse Fun(E)
end).
do_is_redacted(K, ?REDACT_VAL, Fun) ->
Fun(K);
do_is_redacted(K, <<?REDACT_VAL>>, Fun) ->
Fun(K);
do_is_redacted(K, WrappedFun, Fun) when is_function(WrappedFun, 0) ->
%% wrapped by `emqx_secret' or other module
do_is_redacted(K, WrappedFun(), Fun);
do_is_redacted(_K, _V, _Fun) ->
false.
-ifdef(TEST).
-include_lib("eunit/include/eunit.hrl").
redact_test_() ->
Case = fun(Type, KeyT) ->
Key =
case Type of
atom -> KeyT;
string -> erlang:atom_to_list(KeyT);
binary -> erlang:atom_to_binary(KeyT)
end,
?assert(is_sensitive_key(Key)),
%% direct
?assertEqual({Key, ?REDACT_VAL}, redact({Key, foo})),
?assertEqual(#{Key => ?REDACT_VAL}, redact(#{Key => foo})),
?assertEqual({Key, Key, Key}, redact({Key, Key, Key})),
?assertEqual({[{Key, ?REDACT_VAL}], bar}, redact({[{Key, foo}], bar})),
%% 1 level nested
?assertEqual([{Key, ?REDACT_VAL}], redact([{Key, foo}])),
?assertEqual([#{Key => ?REDACT_VAL}], redact([#{Key => foo}])),
%% 2 level nested
?assertEqual(#{opts => [{Key, ?REDACT_VAL}]}, redact(#{opts => [{Key, foo}]})),
?assertEqual(#{opts => #{Key => ?REDACT_VAL}}, redact(#{opts => #{Key => foo}})),
?assertEqual({opts, [{Key, ?REDACT_VAL}]}, redact({opts, [{Key, foo}]})),
%% 3 level nested
?assertEqual([#{opts => [{Key, ?REDACT_VAL}]}], redact([#{opts => [{Key, foo}]}])),
?assertEqual([{opts, [{Key, ?REDACT_VAL}]}], redact([{opts, [{Key, foo}]}])),
?assertEqual([{opts, [#{Key => ?REDACT_VAL}]}], redact([{opts, [#{Key => foo}]}]))
end,
Types = [atom, string, binary],
Keys = [
aws_secret_access_key,
password,
secret,
secret_key,
secret_access_key,
security_token,
token,
bind_password
],
[{case_name(Type, Key), fun() -> Case(Type, Key) end} || Key <- Keys, Type <- Types].
redact2_test_() ->
Case = fun(Key, Checker) ->
?assertEqual({Key, ?REDACT_VAL}, redact({Key, foo}, Checker)),
?assertEqual(#{Key => ?REDACT_VAL}, redact(#{Key => foo}, Checker)),
?assertEqual({Key, Key, Key}, redact({Key, Key, Key}, Checker)),
?assertEqual({[{Key, ?REDACT_VAL}], bar}, redact({[{Key, foo}], bar}, Checker))
end,
Checker = fun(E) -> E =:= passcode end,
Keys = [secret, passcode],
[{case_name(atom, Key), fun() -> Case(Key, Checker) end} || Key <- Keys].
deobfuscate_test() ->
NewConf0 = #{foo => <<"bar0">>, password => <<"123456">>},
?assertEqual(NewConf0, deobfuscate(NewConf0, #{foo => <<"bar">>, password => <<"654321">>})),
NewConf1 = #{foo => <<"bar1">>, password => <<?REDACT_VAL>>},
?assertEqual(
#{foo => <<"bar1">>, password => <<"654321">>},
deobfuscate(NewConf1, #{foo => <<"bar">>, password => <<"654321">>})
),
%% Don't have password before and ignore to put redact_val into new config
NewConf2 = #{foo => <<"bar2">>, password => ?REDACT_VAL},
?assertEqual(#{foo => <<"bar2">>}, deobfuscate(NewConf2, #{foo => <<"bar">>})),
%% Don't have password before and should allow put non-redact-val into new config
NewConf3 = #{foo => <<"bar3">>, password => <<"123456">>},
?assertEqual(NewConf3, deobfuscate(NewConf3, #{foo => <<"bar">>})),
ok.
redact_header_test_() ->
Types = [string, binary, atom],
Keys = [
"auThorization",
"Authorization",
"authorizaTion",
"proxy-authorizaTion",
"proXy-authoriZaTion"
],
Case = fun(Type, Key0) ->
Converter =
case Type of
binary ->
fun erlang:list_to_binary/1;
atom ->
fun erlang:list_to_atom/1;
_ ->
fun(Any) -> Any end
end,
Name = Converter("headers"),
Key = Converter(Key0),
Value = Converter("value"),
Value1 = redact_v(Value),
?assertMatch(
{Name, [{Key, Value1}]},
redact({Name, [{Key, Value}]})
),
?assertMatch(
#{Name := #{Key := Value1}},
redact(#{Name => #{Key => Value}})
)
end,
[{case_name(Type, Key), fun() -> Case(Type, Key) end} || Key <- Keys, Type <- Types].
case_name(Type, Key) ->
lists:concat([Type, "-", Key]).
-endif.

View File

@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
Fixed an issue that unable to subscribe or unsubscribe a shared topic filter via HTTP API.
Releated APIs:
- `/clients/:clientid/subscribe`
- `/clients/:clientid/subscribe/bulk`
- `/clients/:clientid/unsubscribe`
- `/clients/:clientid/unsubscribe/bulk`

View File

@ -0,0 +1 @@
Fixed that the logs of LDAP driver would never be logged, now all of them are logged with `info` level.

View File

@ -0,0 +1 @@
Fix the issue of the endpoint `/prometheus/stats` crashing when the listener's cert file is unreadable.

View File

@ -0,0 +1 @@
Fixed the sensitive headers for HTTP connector may be printed in the `debug` level log.

View File

@ -0,0 +1 @@
Fix incorrect results from rule SQL built-in function `date_to_unix_ts` after March on leap years.

29
changes/e5.5.1.en.md Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
# 5.5.1
## Enhancements
- [#12497](https://github.com/emqx/emqx/pull/12497) Improved MongoDB connector performance, resulting in more efficient database interactions. This enhancement is supported by improvements in the MongoDB Erlang driver as well ([mongodb-erlang PR](https://github.com/emqx/mongodb-erlang/pull/41)).
## Bug Fixes
- [#12471](https://github.com/emqx/emqx/pull/12471) Fixed an issue that data integration configurations failed to load correctly during upgrades from EMQX version 5.0.2 to newer releases.
- [#12542](https://github.com/emqx/emqx/pull/12542) Redacted authorization headers to exclude basic authorization credentials from debug logs in the HTTP Server connector, mitigating potential security risks.
- [#12598](https://github.com/emqx/emqx/pull/12598) Fixed an issue that users were unable to subscribe to or unsubscribe from shared topic filters via HTTP API.
The affected APIs include:
- `/clients/:clientid/subscribe`
- `/clients/:clientid/subscribe/bulk`
- `/clients/:clientid/unsubscribe`
- `/clients/:clientid/unsubscribe/bulk`
- [#12601](https://github.com/emqx/emqx/pull/12601) Fixed an issue where logs of the LDAP driver were not being captured. Now, all logs are recorded at the `info` level.
- [#12606](https://github.com/emqx/emqx/pull/12606) The Prometheus API experienced crashes when the specified SSL certificate file did not exist in the given path. Now, when an SSL certificate file is missing, the `emqx_cert_expiry_at` metric will report a value of 0, indicating the non-existence of the certificate.
- [#12608](https://github.com/emqx/emqx/pull/12608) Fixed a `function_clause` error in the IoTDB action caused by the absence of a `payload` field in query data.
- [#12610](https://github.com/emqx/emqx/pull/12610) Fixed an issue where connections to the LDAP connector could unexpectedly disconnect after a certain period of time.

View File

@ -0,0 +1 @@
Fixed a `function_clause` error for IoTDB action when there is no `payload` field in the query data.

View File

@ -0,0 +1 @@
Fixed that the connection to the LDAP connector may be disconnected after a period of time.

21
changes/v5.5.1.en.md Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
# 5.5.1
## Bug Fixes
- [#12471](https://github.com/emqx/emqx/pull/12471) Fixed an issue that data integration configurations failed to load correctly during upgrades from EMQX version 5.0.2 to newer releases.
- [#12542](https://github.com/emqx/emqx/pull/12542) Redacted authorization headers to exclude basic authorization credentials from debug logs in the HTTP Server connector, mitigating potential security risks.
- [#12598](https://github.com/emqx/emqx/pull/12598) Fixed an issue that users were unable to subscribe to or unsubscribe from shared topic filters via HTTP API.
The affected APIs include:
- `/clients/:clientid/subscribe`
- `/clients/:clientid/subscribe/bulk`
- `/clients/:clientid/unsubscribe`
- `/clients/:clientid/unsubscribe/bulk`
- [#12601](https://github.com/emqx/emqx/pull/12601) Fixed an issue where logs of the LDAP driver were not being captured. Now, all logs are recorded at the `info` level.
- [#12606](https://github.com/emqx/emqx/pull/12606) The Prometheus API experienced crashes when the specified SSL certificate file did not exist in the given path. Now, when an SSL certificate file is missing, the `emqx_cert_expiry_at` metric will report a value of 0, indicating the non-existence of the certificate.